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An indigent woman goes into a clinic to have an abortion. A
young man goes to college to become a Christian minister. Would
you be willing to pay for either pursuit? Regardless of your politics, it
is likely that you would react strongly to your tax dollars funding one
of the above activities, but not the other. While both the indigent
woman and the young man have a constitutional right to engage in
each activity,' whether a state has an obligation to fund either or both
activities is debatable.2
States have limited and dwindling resources to allocate to
promote their interests. Whether a state's choice to fund one interest
while refusing to fund another rises to the level of interference with
protected rights, and therefore violates the state or federal
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1. The freedom of a woman to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy is a personal
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The freedom of a person to pursue his or
her religious beliefs and practices is protected by the First Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious
Schools, 104 HARV. L. REV. 989 (1991).
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constitution, is the central question. However, the line between
promotion of an interest and interference with protected rights is
delicate and easily distorted. An inaccurate characterization of a
state's choice may force that state to fund an activity that its legislature
explicitly forbade.
The religion clauses of the First Amendment provide an
interesting framework in which to explore these questions. The
Constitution requires that "Congress shall make no law respecting the
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof .... ",3  The operation of the Establishment Clause, which
forbids the government from either aiding or formally sponsoring
religion, and the operation of the Free Exercise Clause, which
prohibits the government from inhibiting religious observers' beliefs
or most practices, results in a seemingly inherent enmity. 4 Courts are
charged with the burdensome duty of protecting an individual's
religious liberty in a religiously diverse and changing nation while
balancing other societal interests;5 the ultimate objective is to maintain
government neutrality towards religion.
In 2002, in Davey v. Locke,6 a Ninth Circuit panel held that
Washington State could not refuse to fund the educational expenses of
a student pursing a theology degree, in accordance with the
Washington Constitution's Establishment Clause,7 because that
refusal violated the student's right to free exercise of religion.' On
May 19, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Washington State's
petition for review. The Court's impending decision in Davey will not
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment are applied to state and local governments through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940) (applying the federal Free Exercise Clause to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (applying the federal Establishment
Clause to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
4. See Phillip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in the First Amendment Religious
Doctrine, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 817 (1984). But see Comment, A Non-Conflict Approach to the First
Amendment Religion Clauses, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1175 (1983).
5. Justice Scalia stated in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith:
Precisely because "we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every
conceivable religious preference," ... and precisely because we value and protect
religious divergence, we cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid,
as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect
an interest of the highest order.
494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990) (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)).
6. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2075 (May 19,
2003).
7. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.
8. Davey, 299 F.3d at 760.
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only affect the scope and application of the federal Free Exercise
Clause, it will also implicate overarching questions of federalism and
the role of states in fashioning their own constitutional jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court should reverse the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Davey v. Locke. In Davey, the Ninth Circuit equated Washington's
refusal to allow its Promise Scholarship funds to be used to support
Joshua Davey's theology degree with an affirmative prohibition of his
right to free exercise of religion.' In so doing, the Ninth Circuit
wrongly construed the State's restraint of Davey's free exercise.1"
First, the court sidestepped a true "prohibition" analysis by
incorrectly relying on Joshua Davey's status as a theology student.
Second, by importing free speech criteria into a free exercise
examination based on an establishment neutrality paradigm, the court
wrongly held that the Washington law restricting state funds from
theology students was not neutral. If, applying strict scrutiny, the
Supreme Court affirms the Ninth Circuit's holding that Washington's
Establishment Clause does not provide a compelling justification for
the state to deny funding, the decision could call into question every
9. Id.
10. Cf. Derek D. Green, Does Free Exercise Mean Free State Funding? In Davey v. Locke,
the Ninth Circuit Undervalued Washington's Vision of Religious Liberty, 78 WASH. L. REV. 653
(2003). Green argues that the Ninth Circuit failed to adequately address conflicting Ninth
Circuit precedent, other circuit precedent, and U.S. Supreme Court precedent in conditional
funding cases. Id. at 655. First, Green proposes that the Ninth Circuit should have followed the
analysis of KDM ex rel. WJM v. Reedsport School District, 196 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 1999), and
concludes that the Promise Scholarship does not violate free exercise because it did not have the
object of suppressing religion, and that it should not have been subject to strict scrutiny. Green,
supra at 676-81. Second, Green argues that the Ninth Circuit failed to adequately distinguish
the Promise Scholarship from permissible funding programs. Id. at 681-84. While the author of
this Note agrees with Green that the Ninth Circuit's decision was incorrect and that
Washington's scholarship program does not violate the Free Exercise Clause, this Note presents
a different analysis to reach that conclusion. The author argues that the Promise Scholarship did
not violate free exercise rights because Davey sustained no burden on his belief or practice as a
result of Washington's decision not to fund his theological training. Unlike the author, Green
does not address a "prohibition" analysis.
Although the author agrees with Green that the Promise Scholarship did not have the object
of suppressing religion, the author argues that the Ninth Circuit was incorrect in its analysis in
Davey because the court imported free speech criteria through an establishment neutrality
paradigm to determine that the law was not neutral, rather than arguing that the Ninth Circuit
determined that the law was not neutral on its face. Further, the author agrees with Green that
Washington did not close or limit a public forum; however, this Note focuses on how the Ninth
Circuit used a free speech forum analysis to justify its application of strict scrutiny and why that
use was improper. Green also argues that the Ninth Circuit's reliance on McDaniel v. Paty, 435
U.S. 618 (1978), is misplaced because the penalty imposed on Paty was due to his status as a
minister, while Davey was not penalized but demanded the state to pay for an activity it chose
not to subsidize. The author argues that the McDaniel decision is inapposite because the
protected practices encompassed by a minister's status are not equivalent to a theology student's,
not penalties.
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state's right to enforce its own more protective establishment
provisions in the space provided them by the federal religion clauses.
Following this Introduction, Part II of this Note presents the
factual background and procedural history of Davey v. Locke. The
analysis that follows is divided into three components. Each
component first presents the legal framework, and then applies that
framework to Davey.
Part III discusses the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. Section A provides a basic background on the Supreme
Court's free exercise jurisprudence. Section B applies the Court's
precedent to Davey, and concludes that the Ninth Circuit sidestepped
a true "prohibition" analysis.
Sections A, B, and C of Part IV discuss the differing neutrality
examinations within free exercise, free speech, and establishment
jurisprudence, respectively. Section D discusses the overlapping
application of neutrality criteria in establishment and free speech
funding cases. Section E concludes that in Davey the Ninth Circuit
improperly grafted free speech criteria under an establishment
neutrality paradigm onto its free exercise neutrality examination in
Davey.
Part V discusses the federalism implications of the impending
Supreme Court decision. Section A explains Washington's asserted
interest in the separation of church and state. Section B proposes that
states' more protective establishment provisions should provide a
compelling justification for an incidental burden of a religious
observer's free exercise sufficient to survive strict scrutiny. Section C
argues that Washington State's Establishment Clause is a sufficiently
compelling justification for Washington not to fund Davey's
theological education. Part VI concludes the Note.
II. DAVEY V. LOCKE
A. Factual Background
In 1999, the Washington Legislature and Governor Gary Locke
created the Promise Scholarship." Eligibility for the Promise
Scholarship (Scholarship) was based on the following criteria: (1) the
student must graduate in the top ten percent of his or her high school
class; (2) the student's family income must be equal to or less than 135
percent of the state's median income; and (3) the student must be
attending an accredited public or private university, college, or
11. WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.119 (2002).
[Vol. 27:585
20031 Public Funding for Theological Training 589
accredited post-secondary institution in Washington State. 12  The
purpose of the Scholarship was to "recogniz[e] and encourag[e] the
aspiration for superior academic achievement of high school students
who attend and graduate from Washington high schools., 13
In May 1999, Joshua Davey graduated from University High
School in Spokane, Washington. 4  He applied for the Promise
Scholarship and was notified in August 1999 of his eligibility to
receive $1,125 for the 1999-2000 school year.' Davey enrolled at
Northwest College in Kirkland, Washington, and declared a double
major in Business Management/Administration and Pastoral
Studies. 6 He believed that this combination of majors would "best
prepare [him] for the complex management and spiritual tasks that
comprise contemporary Christian ministry."' 7 At Northwest College,
Pastoral Studies majors take general classes in the humanities,
sciences, and social science; however, the bulk of required courses for
that major consist of biblical and pastoral studies, 8 including classes
21 21in evangelism, 9 apologetics, and Pentecostal doctrines.
12. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020(12) (2001). Graduates in 2000 needed to be in the
top fifteen percent of their class. Id.; see Decl. of Joshua Davey in Supp. of Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim.
Inj., Ex. A, Davey v. Locke, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273 (D. Wash. Oct. 5, 2000) (No. COO-
0061) [hereinafter Decl. of Davey, Ex. A].
13. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-010.
14. Decl. of Davey, Ex. A, supra note 12, at 2.
15. Id. at3,5.
16. Id. at 4. Northwest College is a Christian college located in Kirkland, Washington,
founded by the Assemblies of God in 1934. Assemblies of God, Colleges & Universities,
Northwest College, at http://colleges.ag.org/college..guide/nc.cfm (last visited Nov. 17, 2003).
The Assemblies of God is a Christian denomination from the Pentecostal tradition, which
emphasizes the importance of the baptism of the Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost. This
baptism is manifested by spiritual gifts, such as speaking in tongues and the gift of prophecy.
Doctrinally, apart from Pentecostalism, it is in the Baptist tradition. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
WORLD RELIGIONS 100 (John Bowker ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1997) [hereinafter WORLD
RELIGIONS].
17. Decl. of Davey, Ex. A, supra note 12, at 5.
18. Decl. of Joshua Davey in Supp. of Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Ex. B, Davey v. Locke,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273 (D. Wash. Oct. 5, 2000) (No. COO-0061).
19. "Evangelism" is defined as "the winning or revival of personal commitments to
Christ." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 429 (Merriam-Webster 1983).
20. "Apologetics" is defined as "the branch of theology concerned with the defense of the
divine origin of Christianity." Id. at 95.
21. "Pentecostal" is defined as:
Groups of Christians who emphasize the decent of the Holy Spirit on the apostles at
the first (Christian) Pentecost .... There is thus a strong eschatological emphasis,
exalting spiritual experience over intellectual reflection. It is characterized by
participatory forms of worship--hand-clapping, dance, raised arms, prophesy-and
has had a strong appeal to the poor and less educated ....
WORLD RELIGIONS, supra note 16, at 744.
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In October 1999, the college's financial aid administrator
received a letter from the Washington State Higher Education
Coordinating Board (HECB), stating that "[s]tudents who are
pursuing a degree in theology are not eligible to receive any state-
funded financial aid, including the new Washington Promise
Scholarship. '22 The HECB's decision to send the letter was prompted
by a Washington statute that states, "No aid shall be awarded to any
student who is pursuing a degree in theology. ' 23  The statute was
enacted in 1969 in accordance with the Establishment Clause of the
Washington Constitution.24  Northwest College's financial aid office
notified Davey that students majoring in "theology-related fields"
were not eligible for the Promise Scholarship.25
B. Procedural History
In January 2000, Davey filed an action in federal district court
against Governor Locke and the officials of HECB to enjoin HECB
from withdrawing the scholarship funds.26  Davey claimed that the
prohibition of state funds being applied toward a degree in theology
violated his federal and state constitutional rights of freedom of
speech, equal protection, and free exercise. In his declaration, Davey
stated: "It seemed to me like the state [by withdrawing the scholarship
money] was simply imposing a back-door tax on religious believers,
and I knew that was wrong."27 As a result of the withdrawal of the
scholarship money, Davey claimed that an imposed burden would be
placed on him because he would be forced to work an additional
eighty hours in the academic year, 28 which is less than three hours per
week during the school year. He stated that during this time he would
not be able to "study, attend class, or associate with [his] fellow
believers for worship. "29
22. Decl. of Joshua Davey in Supp. of Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Ex. H, Davey v. Locke,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273 (D. Wash. Oct. 5, 2000) (No. COO-0061) [hereinafter Decl. of
Davey, Ex. H].
23. WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.10.814 (2002); see Decl. of Davey, Ex. H, supra note 22.
24. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11; WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.10.814.
25. Decl. of Davey, Ex. A, supra note 12, at S.
26. Verified Compl. for Decl. & Inj. Relief & Damages, Davey v. Locke, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22273 (D. Wash. 2000) (No. COO-0061). In addition to Gov. Gary Locke, other named
defendants are Marcus S. Gaspard, Executive Director of HECB; Bob Craves, Chair of HECB;
and John Klacik, Associate Director of HECB. Id.
27. Decl. of Davey, Ex. A, supra note 12, at 7.
28. Id. at 8.
29. Id.
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The HECB argued that its withdrawal of the Promise
Scholarship did not violate any of Davey's constitutional rights.3" The
HECB further argued that allowing Davey to use state funds toward a
degree in pastoral ministries would violate Washington law and the
Establishment Clause of the Washington Constitution. 31  The
Washington Constitution specifically provides that "[n]o public
money or property shall be apportioned for or applied to any religious
worship, exercise, or instruction .... 32
Judge Rothstein, of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington, in response to cross motions for summary
judgment, held in favor of the HECB and dismissed all of Davey's
claims.3 3  Particularly, the district court held that withdrawing the
scholarship money did not violate Davey's right to free exercise as
guaranteed by the First Amendment because Washington was not
prohibiting Davey from pursuing a degree in pastoral ministries;
Washington was merely refusing to fund that pursuit.34
In a 2-1 decision, the Ninth Circuit overturned Judge Rothstein's
order dismissing Davey's claims.35 The panel majority held that once
the Promise Scholarship was available to all students who met the
objective criteria, the financial benefit needed to be available on a
viewpoint-neutral basis.36 Further, the court held that limiting the
scholarship to students who were not pursuing a degree in theology
violated Davey's right to free exercise and must be subjected to strict
scrutiny. Finally, the court held that Washington's interest in
adhering to its own constitutional prohibition against application of
state funds toward religious instruction was not a compelling
justification for the violation.37 Judge McKeown disagreed with the
30. Def.'s Mem. of Authorities in Supp. of Mot. for S.J. at *9-23, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22273 (D. Wash. 2000) (No. COO-0061).
3 1. Id. at *4-9.
32. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.
33. Davey, 2000 LEXIS 22273 at *26. Judge Rothstein rejected Davey's free speech and
free association claims on the grounds that Davey did not identify any restriction on his speech,
and that the right to association does not include a right to have the state underwrite his religious
education in order to "free him of the real world obligations of supporting himself during
school." Id. at *23. Furthermore, the district court rejected Davey's equal protection claims on
the basis that the Washington statute denying funding for a degree in theology was enacted to
prevent violation of the Washington State Establishment Clause, and that the treatment satisfies
the requirement that it be "reasonable, not arbitrary, and.., rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of legislation." Id. at *24-25
(quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)).
34. Id. at *18-19.
35. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 760 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2075 (May
19, 2003).
36. Id. at 756.
37. Id. at 760.
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panel majority, stating: "This is a funding case, not a free exercise case
or a free speech case."38
C. The Dissent: Is Refusing to Fund Tantamount to Prohibiting Belief or
Practice?
The counter argument to the panel majority's decision in Davey
is that a refusal to fund Davey's pursuit of a degree in theology is not
equivalent to prohibiting his right to free exercise. Judge McKeown's
dissent illustrates the difference between a funding inquiry and a free
exercise inquiry by drawing an analogy between Washington's
decision not to fund Davey's religious study with states' decisions not
to fund abortions for indigent women.39 The dissent argued that the
abortion cases "represent an inescapable conclusion as to the lack of a
burdensome effect of funding decisions, a conclusion that should have
even more purchase in the context of the Religion Clauses."4
The abortion funding cases distinguish between situations in
which a state places barriers that inhibit a person from exercising a
protected right and situations where the state merely refuses to fund a
person's pursuit of a protected right.4' For example, in Maher v.
Roe,42 two indigent women brought a suit challenging a Connecticut
Welfare Department regulation that limited state-funded Medicaid
benefits to medically necessary first trimester abortions as a violation
of their Equal Protection rights.43 Neither of the plaintiffs received the
38. Id. at 761.
39. Id. at 764-66.
40. Id. at 765.
41. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 (1980). The abortion funding cases present the
same difficult questions posed by Davey regarding the possibility of governmental coercion and
prohibition through fund distribution. This is not to purport that inquiries under free exercise
and abortion funding are equivalent. That the right to free exercise involves freedom to act and
believe, and that abortion is protected as a right to privacy, is a fundamental difference between
the two. However, abortion funding is important to keep as a reference point. Particularly
within the context of Davey, it is easy to muddle the difference between affirmative governmental
action and coercion that prohibits or hinders religion, and a simple choice by the government not
to fund religious pursuits due to other legislative policies. Thinking of a state's refusal to fund in
a different context enables one to separate the specific facts of the Davey case from the
underlying fundamental principles of the inquiry. Admittedly, the withdrawal of a $1125
scholarship appears to effectuate an unfair result as applied to Joshua Davey on the surface,
leaving one with the sense that the withdrawal of the scholarship implicates some First
Amendment violation. It would seem to be rather innocuous for Washington to bend the
restriction in its constitution and apply the funds toward Davey's theological training. However,
it is precisely for this reason that it is important to keep the abortion funding cases as a reference
point and revisit the fundamental questions posed in both contexts.
42. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
43. Id. at 467. Three years later, the Supreme Court ruled that a federal statute denying
funding to medically necessary abortions was not unconstitutional. Harris, 448 U.S. at 326.
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necessary doctor's certificates that would have allowed the cost of their
abortions to be covered by Medicaid under the statute.44 The
Supreme Court held that the Connecticut statute was not a violation of
the women's Fourteenth Amendment rights.4" Justice Powell stated:
"There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a
protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity
consonant with legislative policy. ' ' 6 Thus, the Court acknowledged
that, while women have a constitutionally protected right to an
abortion, the government is allowed to encourage childbirth as long asit did not inhibit that right. 47 Furthermore, in a later abortion funding
case, the Court opined that the refusal to fund an activity, without
more, is not equivalent to a state-imposed penalty on that activity. 48
D. The Question Comes Before the U.S. Supreme Court
Washington's Governor Locke and the HECB petitioned for a
writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court after the Ninth Circuit
denied their petition for rehearing.49 On May 19, 2003, the Supreme
Court granted the petition to hear the case. ° Oral arguments were
heard before the Court on December 2, 2003."' Washington
presented the question before the Court as whether the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires the
state to fund religious instruction if the state provides college
scholarship for other secular instruction. 2 Conversely, Davey framed
the question as follows:
Where a State chooses to award scholarships based on neutral
criteria to financially needy, academically gifted students, does
the State violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
44. Maher, 432 U.S. at 467.
45. Id. at 479.
46. Id. at 475.
47. Id. at 474.
48. Harris, 448 U.S. at 317.
49. Brief for Petitioners at 1, Locke v. Davey, 123 S. Ct. 2075 (2003) (No. 02-1315).
50. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2075 (May 19,
2003).
51. At oral argument, Justice Breyer stated to Solictor General Theodore Olson, who
argued on behalf of Davey, that the implications of this case were "breathtaking." Oral
Arguments to U.S. Sup. Ct. in Locke v. Davey (Dec. 2, 2003). The Court seemed particularly
concerned with the potential effect of a decision favorable to Davey on voucher cases.
Surprisingly, the justices asked very few questions regarding the alleged violation of Davey's free
exercise and aimed their questions more toward establishment principles. Justice O'Connor,
however, opened questioning on Davey's counsel, asking how Davey's free exercise was violated.
Justice Ginsberg repeatedly inquired about the space between the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause, pointing counsel to the federalism implications of the case.
52. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 49, at i.
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U.S. Constitution when it discriminatorily strips the scholarship
from an otherwise eligible student for the sole reason that the
student declares a major in theology taught from a religious
perspective? 3
The Supreme Court is expected to issue its decision in Locke v.
Davey sometime in May 2004."4
III. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In Part III, the theoretical underpinnings of the Free Exercise
Clause and the structure of a free exercise inquiry will be discussed,
specifically focusing on the prohibition requirement. This discussion
will be followed by a comparison of the objective of neutrality within
the free exercise, free speech, and establishment inquiries to the
federalism problem posed by the Supreme Court's impending
decision.
A. Background on the Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment protects
individuals' ability to engage in religious practice without
governmental interference."5 It "embraces two concepts-freedom to
believe and freedom to act."5 6 Generally, free exercise cases involve
religious believers refusing to follow laws that are in conflict with their
religious beliefs or practices, 57 and where courts create religious
exemptions in otherwise generally applicable laws or regulations.5"
Free exercise interests may also be implicated when the government
mandates specific conduct that one's religious practices or beliefs
prohibit, 9 or when government action imposes a substantial burden
53. Id.
54. Robert Marshall Wells & Janet I. Tu, Supreme Court to Hear State Religious Rights
Case, SEATTLE TIMES, May 20, 2003, at Al, available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/134775189_studyreligion20m.html.
55. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
56. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
57. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (holding that a federal law
prohibiting polygamy applied to a Mormon, who stated his religion required him to engage in
the practice, as long as the law did not prohibit the belief).
58. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (holding that a Seventh-day
Adventist was exempt from a state statute requiring willingness to work on Saturdays in order to
qualify for unemployment benefits).
59. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (holding that because of
religious beliefs, the Amish are constitutionally exempt from a state law requiring compulsory
education through age sixteen); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(holding that the law cannot compel school children to salute the American flag when it is against
their religious beliefs).
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on one's religious belief or practice.6" While the government is never
allowed to regulate religious belief,6' it may prohibit or hinder a
practice if the regulation of that practice can be justified by a
compelling governmental interest.62
Until the 1960s, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence did not
contain a simple, standard test for evaluating free exercise claims.63 In
1963, beginning with its decision in Sherbert v. Verner,64 the Court
began employing a balancing test that weighed the importance of the
governmental interest in enforcing a challenged law against the burden
placed on those who were required to comply with the law by acting in
conflict with their religious beliefs.65 In Sherbert, the South Carolina
Employment Security Commission declared a Seventh-day
Adventist 66 woman ineligible for unemployment benefits because she
would not work on Saturdays. 67 The South Carolina Unemployment
Compensation Act required that a claimant be able to and available
for work on Saturdays or when assigned, and that a refusal to accept
suitable work disqualified a claimant from receiving unemployment
benefits.68 The Court held that the statutory condition infringed on
the woman's right to free exercise, and that there was no compelling
state interest shown to justify such infringement. 69  Based on the
Court's analysis in Sherbert, any government action that imposes a
substantial burden on religious observers' beliefs or practices is subject
to strict scrutiny. 70
In 1990, in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
of Oregon v. Smith,7' the Court restricted the application of Sherbert,
holding that neutral laws of general applicability are not subject to
60. See, e.g., Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (The government imposed a substantial burden on a
Seventh-day Adventist's religious practice by disqualifying her from unemployment benefits for
not being available to work on Saturdays.).
61. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961) ("The freedom to hold religious
beliefs and opinions is absolute.").
62. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531
(1993).
63. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940).
64. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
65. Id. at 403, 406.
66. Seventh-day Adventists are "[m]embers of Christian sects who believe that the Second
Coming of Jesus Christ is literal and imminent." WORLD RELIGIONS, supra note 16, at 22.
67. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399.
68. Id. at 400 n.3; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 68-1 to -404 (Law. Co-op. 1962).
69. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404, 408-09. The Court has repeatedly confined this holding to
the unemployment compensation line of cases. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
70. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
71. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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strict scrutiny, even if those laws have the incidental effect of
burdening a particular religious practice.7 2 In Smith, members of the
Native American Church were discharged from their jobs at a drug
rehabilitation organization after ingesting peyote, a controlled
substance under Oregon law. 3 The Oregon Employment Division
determined that the ingestion of peyote constituted work-related
misconduct and disqualified the members from eligibility for
unemployment benefits. 4  The Court, refusing to extend an
exemption to the members of the Native American Church, found
that the prohibition against the use of peyote was constitutional
because Oregon law was a neutral law of general applicability.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated: "The government's
ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful
conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy,'cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a
religious objector's spiritual development. ' 71
The Smith test was affirmed and applied in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah (Lukumi).77 The Church of the
Lukumi Babalu, whose members are practitioners of the Santeria
religion, 78 filed an action against the City of Hialeah challenging the
constitutionality of an ordinance outlawing animal sacrifice. 79  The
Court expanded the Smith holding, stating that laws failing to be
neutral and of general applicability must "be justified by a compelling
governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that
interest."8  The Court held that the Hialeah ordinance was neither
neutral nor of general application, and therefore was subject to strict
scrutiny.81
72. Id. at 884-86.
73. Id. at 874; OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1987); OR. ADMIN. R. 855-80-021(3)(s)
(1988).
74. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
75. Id. at 881-82.
76. Id. at 885 (quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S.
493,451 (1988)).
77. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
78. Santeria means "way of the saints." WORLD RELIGIONS, supra note 16, at 856. The
religion has both Yoruba African and Spanish Catholic roots. Id. Practitioners may have a
personal orisha ("spirit") of a saint, whose survival depends on the power of animal sacrifice.
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 525.
79. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 527-28.
80. Id. at 531-32.
81. Id. at 540-46.
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B. Government Prohibition of Belief or Practice
Section B discusses the archetypal settings in which the Court
has found governmental prohibitions that violate the Free Exercise
Clause. Section C concludes that Washington State's withdrawal of
the Promise Scholarship neither prohibited nor imposed a substantial
burden on Joshua Davey's religious belief or practice. Part IV will
then discuss the neutrality inquiry of a governmental regulation that
prohibits or substantially burdens religious belief or practice.
The threshold question in any free exercise inquiry is whether
state action has prohibited a religious observer's belief or practice.
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment fundamentally
protects against government prohibition of religious belief or practice:
"Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion]. 82 As Justice O'Connor has stated, "The crucial word in the
constitutional text is 'prohibit': 'For the Free Exercise Clause is
written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual,
not in terms of what the individual can exact from the government.""'
Within free exercise jurisprudence, the term "prohibit" can be defined
simply as "to forbid or prevent," 84 or the term can be defined as
limitedly encompassing substantial burdens placed on religious
observers by the government." In addition to outright prohibitions,
indirect coercion or penalties that discourage the free exercise of
religion are subject to First Amendment scrutiny.86  However, as
Justice O'Connor notes,
This does not and cannot imply that incidental effects of
government programs, which may make it more difficult to
82. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
83. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S 439, 451 (1988)
(quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring)). Lyng was a free
exercise case involving Native American tribes in Northwest California contesting the Forest
Service's plans to allow timber harvesting and road construction in a national forest that the
tribes used for spiritual development. Id. The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not
prohibit the government from permitting timber harvesting and road construction in the area
because the government's actions did not coerce tribal members from acting contrary to their
beliefs. Id. at 458.
84. "Prohibit" is defined as "(1) to forbid by authority; and (2) to prevent from doing
something." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 940. For
a textual analysis of "prohibit" and the Free Exercise Clause, see Allan Ides, The Text of the Free
Exercise Clause as a Measure of Employment Division v. Smith and The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 135, 143-51 (1994).
85. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Smith, warned that, "[elven if we were
inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the unemployment compensation field, we
would not apply it to require exemptions from a generally applicable criminal law." Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
86. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450.
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practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce
individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, require
government to bring forward a compelling justification for its
otherwise lawful actions.8 7
Government actions that constitute a prohibition under the First
Amendment can be illustrated by analyzing state-instituted barriers,
as interpreted by the Supreme Court in two seminal free exercise
cases, Smith and Sherbert."s First, the classic setting of government
prohibition of a religious observer's belief or practice is where an
enacted law specifically outlaws a particular practice. In Smith, for
example, state law prohibited the plaintiffs from ingesting peyote, a
hallucinogenic drug from the stem of the peyote cactus.8 9 Possession
of peyote is a Class B felony under Oregon law.9" However, members
of the Native American Church use peyote for sacramental purposes
in a Saturday all-night ritual of prayers and songs.9 The act of eating,
smoking, or drinking peyote "brings peace and healing, resists
alcoholism, and gives visions of the Peyote Spirit who is regarded
either as Jesus or an Indian equivalent."92  By outlawing the use of
peyote, Oregon placed an affirmative barrier between the members of
the Native American Church and their sacramental ingestion of
peyote, which is a central tenet of their religious practice.
The second setting in which the Court has found a barrier to free
exercise is where the government imposes a substantial burden on a
religious observer's belief or practice. In Sherbert, the plaintiff was a
Seventh-day Adventist, who, because of religious beliefs, would not
work on Saturdays;93 she was thus declared ineligible for state
unemployment benefits.94 In the Seventh-day Adventist tradition,
Saturday is reserved as the Sabbath, a day of rest for practitioners
when working is forbidden. The Court held that this
disqualification prohibited her free exercise because the plaintiffs
"declared ineligibility for benefits derives solely from the practice of
her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that practice is
87. Id. at 450-51.
88. See discussion supra Part III.A.
89. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 475.005(6), .992(4)(a) (1987).
90. Id. § 475.992(4); OR. ADMIN. R. 855-80-021(3)(s) (1988).
91. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874; WORLD RELIGIONS, supra note 16, at 747.
92. WORLD RELIGIONS, supra note 16, at 747.
93. Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398, 399 (1963).
94. Id. at 401.
95. Observation of the Sabbath has its roots in Judaism and is in honor of God's rest on the
seventh day of creation. Jewish tradition, similar in this respect to Seventh-day Adventist
tradition, teaches that if Jews keep the Sabbath, the Messiah will come. WORLD RELIGIONS,
supra note 16, at 829.
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unmistakable."96 Sherbert represents a limited broadening of the scope
of the term "prohibit" to include laws that substantially burdened a
particular practice but did not prohibit it outright. 97
The underlying rationale for Sherbert's expansion of the term"prohibit" to encompass substantial burdens imposed by the
government was that "[t]he ruling forces her to choose between
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the
one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order
to accept work, on the other hand." 98 Seventh-day Adventists believe
that Christ's second coming is delayed because of the failure of
practitioners to keep the Sabbath on Saturdays.99 The South Carolina
law set before the Seventh-day Adventists a choice between collecting
unemployment benefits and contributing to, according to her beliefs,
delaying the second coming of Christ; the necessity of this choice
imposed a substantial burden upon the practitioner.
C. The Ninth Circuit Sidestepped a True "Prohibition" Analysis in
Davey v. Locke
Rather than inquiring whether Washington's withdrawal of the
scholarship prohibited or imposed a substantial burden on Joshua
Davey's religious belief or practice, the Ninth Circuit panel
sidestepped a true prohibition analysis altogether. In place of the
prohibition analysis, relying on McDaniel v. Paty,'° the court
artificially crafted a prohibition based on Davey's status as a theology
student."1 In McDaniel, a plurality of the Supreme Court found that a
Tennessee statute disqualifying ministers from serving as delegates at
a Tennessee constitutional convention violated a minister's right to
free exercise." 2 The Court framed the violation as the state forcing
Paty to have to choose between one guaranteed right and anther." 3 In
Davey, the Ninth Circuit analogized Washington's withdrawal of the
Promise Scholarship on the basis of Davey's status as a theology
student to Tennessee's disqualification of Paty as a constitutional
96. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
97. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. For a discussion of the limitations of Sherbert, see City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513-16 (1997).
98. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
99. WORLD RELIGIONS, supra note 16, at 22.
100. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
101. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 753-54 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2075
(May 19, 2003).
102. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 629.
103. Id. at 626. The right of Tennessee's citizens to seek and hold office is guaranteed by
the Tennessee Constitution. TENN. CONST., art. 2 §§ 9, 25, 26.
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delegate on the basis of his status as a minister."04 The Ninth Circuit
crafted the analogy as follows: "A minister could not be both a
minister and a delegate in Tennessee any more than Davey can be
both a student pursuing a degree in theology and a Promise Scholar in
Washington.""'5
The Ninth Circuit erred in this analogy because the McDaniel
court was concerned not with Paty's disqualification from the
delegation because of his status as a minister alone, but with the
constitutionally protected practices that create that status. 10 6  The
choice made Paty abandon either the practices that define a person as a
minister, such as preaching and proselytizing, or his right to be a
delegate." 7
While it may be a permissible characterization that the
Washington law required Davey to choose between a being Promise
Scholar and a theology student, the law cannot be construed as forcing
Davey to abstain from activities that define his status as a theology
student to pursue some other guaranteed right as the plaintiff in
McDaniel. First, there is a fundamental difference between being a
constitutional delegate and a Promise Scholar. While the former is a
right guaranteed by a state's constitution, the latter is a categorization
of someone as a recipient of state funds: the two are not equivalent or
even analogous. Second, while Paty was forced to abstain from the
protected practices of preaching and proselytizing if he became a
delegate, Davey would not be similarly forced to abstain from any
protected practices if he were to accept the scholarship and resign his
status as a theology major. Unlike performing religious practices such
as baptizing and administering the sacraments as a minister, a
theology student studies these practices. To be a Promise Scholar,
Davey would not be required to abandon his intellectual pursuit of
theology; he simply could not use Washington State funds to do it.
Thus, the reliance on McDaniel as a foundation for the decision in
Davey is inapposite.
The Supreme Court should reject the Ninth Circuit's free
exercise analysis for three reasons. First, the Free Exercise Clause
does not protect the pursuit of an academic degree. Second,
Washington's refusal to help fund Davey's theological training neither
prohibited Joshua Davey from his religious belief or practice nor
substantially burdened it. Third, by construing a refusal to fund
104. Davey, 299 F.3d at 754.
105. Id. (emphasis in original).
106. Cf. Green, supra note 10, at 680-81.
107. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626.
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theological training as a prohibition of belief or practice, Davey
expands the term "prohibition" within the free exercise inquiry, and
paints free exercise in terms of what religious believers may exact from
government.
There is a fundamental difference between pursuing an academic
degree, even one leading to the profession of ministry, and activities
that are pillars of one's religious practice.0 8 Majoring in theology is
not a Christian belief or practice.' Davey's belief may have
prompted his selection of major, but the pursuit of a theology degree
itself is not tantamount to baptism, accepting the sacraments, or
prayer.
Despite the Court's refusal to investigate "centrality" of religious
belief,"0 the Court has only extended free exercise protection to
practices around which a particular religion is based. For example, in
Sherbert, North Carolina's unemployment law imposed a substantial
burden on a Seventh-day Adventist's practice because it made her
choose between observing the Sabbath on Saturdays and collecting
unemployment benefits."' Seventh-day Adventists believe that
Christ's second coming is delayed because of the failure of
practitioners to keep the Sabbath." 2  Lukumi, where the practice of
animal sacrifice was prohibited, is also instructive on the centrality of
religious practice protected by free exercise and on the threshold at
which free exercise protection will be extended." 3 Animal sacrifice
within the Santeria religion, the practice at issue in Lukumi, is a type of
devotion to orishas, or spirits, that ensures their survival." 4 The
orishas help Santeria practitioners fulfill their destiny from God."5
Washington's refusal to fund Davey's theological training did
not prohibit Davey from any constitutionally protected belief or
practice. The Ninth Circuit panel failed to identify a barrier erected
by Washington because there is none. Davey does not argue that such
a barrier exists; rather, he characterizes the restriction as a "religious
108. Incidentally, Joshua Davey is no longer pursuing a profession in the ministry, but has
decided to go to law school. In fall 2003, he enrolled at Harvard University School of Law.
Robert Marshall Wells & Janet I. Tu, Supreme Court to Hear State Religious Rights Case,
SEATTLE TIMES, May 20, 2003, at Al, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/
localnews/ 134775189_studyreligion20m.html.
109. See generally Ken Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L.
REV. 753 (1984) (discussing how courts should define "religion" when the presence of religion is
seriously controverted).
110. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990).
111. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-04.
112. WORLD RELIGIONS, supra note 16, at 22.
113. Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
114. Id. at 525.
115. Id. at 524.
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gerrymander.".16 Joshua Davey made the decision to attend a private
Christian college and to use his college education to pursue a career in
the Christian ministry before being notified of his receipt of the
Promise Scholarship. 117 Moreover, Davey continued to pursue a major
in theology even after the money was withdrawn." 8 The Washington
law establishing the restriction that State funds not be applied to
theological training did not regulate Davey's practice. Rather, the law
regulated the distribution of Washington taxpayer's money in
accordance with the Washington State Constitution.
By withdrawing the scholarship funds, Washington did not
impose a substantial burden on Davey's belief or practice comparable
to that imposed on the plaintiff in Sherbert. Davey was no worse off
after the Scholarship money was withdrawn than he was before being
notified that he had received the scholarship. Although the
Scholarship would have subsidized Davey's major course of study, its
revocation did not restrict Davey's right to pursue his religion or
coerce him from its practice. Rather, revoking the Scholarship made
Davey's choice of major slightly more expensive; after the revocation,
Davey had to work fewer than three additional hours a week." 9
During these three hours, Davey could not go to class, study, or
associate with his fellow believers for worship. 2 ' This burden pales
when compared to the threshold burden imposed on the plaintiff in
Sherbert, who was forced to choose between collecting unemployment
benefits, her only income, and disobeying a tenet of her religious
practice.' 2' Any burden imposed on Davey was an incidental effect of
the Washington law, not a coercive purpose of it.
Finally, the Supreme Court should not expand the protection of
the Free Exercise Clause to include benefits exacted from the
government. The plurality in McDaniel cautions that expanding the
scope of the First Amendment's protection might leave the
government powerless to advance compelling government interests.122
Davey's right to religious practice and belief without governmental
interference is fundamentally guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause.
These rights should be zealously protected. However, Washington's
refusal to fund Davey's theological training does not violate the Free
116. Brief of Respondent at 18-24, Locke v. Davey, 123 S. Ct. 2075 (2003) (No. 02-1315).
117. Decl. of Davey, Ex. A, supra note 12, at 4; Brief of Respondent, supra note 116, at 3-
4.
118. Brief of Respondent, supra note 116, at 6.
119. Decl. of Davey, Ex. A, supra note 12, at 8.
120. Id.
121. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399-402.
122. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 627 n.7.
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Exercise Clause unless it clearly prohibits or substantially burdens
Davey's religious beliefs or practices. By precluding the government's
denial of an educational subsidy, the Ninth Circuit extends free
exercise protection significantly beyond a level neither originally
envisioned nor currently understood.
IV. THE NEUTRALITY INQUIRY
In addition to sidestepping a true prohibition analysis, the Ninth
Circuit panel incorrectly conducted the neutrality inquiry under a free
exercise analysis. Part IV examines the neutrality requirements within
the inquiries of free exercise, free speech, and establishment, positing
that the Ninth Circuit improperly imported free speech criteria
through an establishment neutrality paradigm into its free exercise
inquiry.
Traditional examination of the relationship between the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause has articulated the
goal of neutrality: the government must remain neutral toward
religion, and it must not favor one religion over another or
unnecessarily burden or discourage religious practice.'23 However, the
inquiry into neutrality and the process of achieving it are not identical
in each examination. Before examining the analytical error of the
Ninth Circuit's construction of neutrality and the implications of a
possible Supreme Court decision affirming that construction, it is
important to discuss the neutrality understandings within free
exercise, free speech, and establishment jurisprudence.
A. The Neutrality Inquiry Under the Free Exercise Clause
While the concept of neutrality underlies many free exercise
decisions, it was formally imported into the analysis of free exercise in
Lukumi and Smith.'24 Laws examined in free exercise analyses are
generally regulatory in nature.'25 A law is not facially neutral "if the
object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their
religious motivation."' 26 To determine its object, the law must be
examined, beginning with its text, to determine if the law is
discriminatory on its face.' 27 The law is found to be not facially
neutral if "it refers to a religious practice without a secular meaning
123. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
124. Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520, 533-34 (1993); Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
125. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 880.
126. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.
127. Id.
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discernable from the language or context. ' 12' The purpose of this
inquiry is clear: the Court is attempting to protect individual free
exercise from government "hostility which is masked, as well as
overt."' 29
This inquiry was conducted in Lukumi and is instructive on its
application. 3 ' In Lukumi, the Court found that the law outlawing
animal sacrifice was facially discriminatory. 3 The Court examined
the words "sacrifice" and "ritual" in the text of the city ordinance
outlawing animal sacrifice, as well as looking at the ordinance's
operation.'32 The Florida law, purporting to regulate cruelty to
animals, applied to any individual or group that "kills, slaughters or
sacrifices animals for any type of ritual, regardless of whether or not
the flesh or blood of the animal is to be consumed."' 33 The Court
found that the purpose of the ordinance was to suppress the exercise of
the Santeria religion by targeting practices that were central to its
belief' 34
Strict scrutiny applies if a law is not one of general
applicability.'35 While all laws are selective to some extent, the
"categories of selection are of paramount concern when a law has the
incidental effect of burdening religious practice." '36 General
applicability of a law regulating animal sacrifice failed in Lukumi
because it targeted Santeria animal sacrifice without targeting all other
animal killings.'37
B. The Criteria of Neutrality under the Free Speech Clause
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment provides that
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech."' 38
The core protection of this provision is that the government may not
restrict expression based on "its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
or its content.""' While content-based regulations on speech are
presumptively invalid, 4° content-neutral regulations are only subject
128. Id.
129. Id. at 534.
130. Id. at 533-34.
131. Id. at 534.
132. Id. at 534-35.
133. Id. at 527.
134. Id. at 542.
135. Id. at 546.
136. Id. at 542.
137. Id. at 542-46.
138. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
139. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
140. See, e.g., RAVv. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
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to intermediate scrutiny....  "Laws [regulating speech] pose the
inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate
regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or
manipulate the public debate through coercion rather, than
persuasion.' 4 2 The government may impose restrictions on the time,
place, and manner of speech when the speech takes place in a public
forum.'4 3
Restrictions on speech in a traditional public forum are subject to
stricter scrutiny than restrictions on speech in a limited public
forum.'44 In a limited public forum, the government may reserve the
forum for certain groups or topics;'4 5 however, the government's
restriction may not "discriminate against speech on the basis of the
speaker's viewpoint, and the 'restriction must be reasonable in light of
the purpose served by the forum."" 46
The Court has used a forum analysis in connection with a case
involving religious viewpoint only when the case has involved free
speech violations."' For example, in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors
of the University of Virginia,48 the Court held that the University of
Virginia had opened a limited public forum by authorizing the
payment of printing costs for a variety of student publications to
outside contractors.'49 The university's denial of reimbursement by
the Student Activities Fund for printing a student publication based
on religious viewpoint offended the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment.' The Court distinguished content discrimination from
viewpoint discrimination, stating: "Viewpoint discrimination is thus
an egregious form of content discrimination. The government must
abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology
or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the
restriction.' 51  Thus, the refusal to fund student publications
141. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
142. Id. at 641.
143. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 US. 788, 799-800
(1985). There are three types of fora: (1) the traditional public forum; (2) the public forum
created by government designation; and (3) the nonpublic forum. Id. at 802.
144. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
145. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
146. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001) (quoting
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806).
147. For an overview of government funding for religious expression, see Stuart L. Lark,
Religious Expression, Government Funds, and the First Amendment, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 317
(2003).
148. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
149. Id. at 822, 830.
150. Id. at 837.
151. Id. at 829.
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expressing a religious viewpoint was impermissible viewpoint
discrimination because it was directed against speech that otherwise
fell within the limitations of the forum.152
C. The Neutrality Paradigm of the Establishment Clause
The federal Establishment Clause is based on the principle that
the government cannot sponsor or formally establish religion.' The
purpose of this clause is to prevent any form of indoctrination or
symbolic union between the state and religion.'54 It is well established
that "government inculcation of religious beliefs has the impermissible
effect of advancing religion."' 5  The Court has acknowledged that
"[it] can only dimly perceive the boundaries of permissible
government activity in this sensitive area."P5 6
In interpreting the underlying objectives of the Establishment
Clause, the Court has shifted its emphasis from protecting liberty to
guaranteeing equality.'57 When the Establishment Clause was first
made applicable to the states through Everson v. Board of Education of
Ewing Township 5 ' in 1947, the Court's opinion indicated that the aim
of the Establishment Clause was to protect religious minorities from
persecution through a strict separation of church and state. 59 In the
decades that followed, this purpose evolved from protecting the
religious minority from exclusion,1 60 to protecting against political
divisiveness along religious lines by avoiding excessive entanglement
between church and state.' 61  In Lemon v. Kurtzman,.62 decided in
152. Id. at 829-30.
153. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 313 (2000) (holding that the
religious liberty protected by the Establishment Clause is abridged when the State affirmatively
sponsors the religious practice of prayer).
154. Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985) ("It follows that an important concern of
the effects test is whether the symbolic union of church and state effected by the challenged
governmental action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the controlling
denominations as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual
religious choices.").
155. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223 (1997).
156. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971).
157. See Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment
Clause, 90 CAL. L. REV. 673 (2002) (Professor Feldman provides a comprehensive history of the
development of the modern Establishment Clause.).
158. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
159. Id. at 11. Justice Black, writing for the majority, heralded the famous maxim of
Thomas Jefferson, stating: "The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state.
That wall must be kept high and impregnable." Id. at 18.
160. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 71, 333 U.S. 203, 227-
28 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Feldman, supra note 157, at 684-85.
161. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
162. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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1971, the Court established new criteria by which to assess whether a
law violates the federal Establishment Clause. 163 In order to satisfy the
Lemon test, a law had to satisfy the following three criteria: (1) the law
had to have a secular purpose; (2) the law's primary effect neither
advanced nor inhibited religion; and (3) the law did not create an
excessive entanglement between the church and the state.'64 The
policy behind Lemon was that the government remained neutral
toward religion in a separationist sense; a strict separation between
church and state was needed to guard against religious persecution and
to avoid excessive entanglement. While not yet overruled, the Lemon
test has been widely criticized by members of the Court. 6 ' For
example, Justice Scalia likened the Lemon test to "some ghoul in a late-
night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles
abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried .... 166
Despite the criticism, the separationist sentiment underlying the
Lemon test was evident in subsequent Establishment cases. For
example, the Court applied the Lemon test in Tilton v. Richardson,167
where it allowed public funds to go to private religious colleges and
universities. 168  The Court distinguished Tilton from Lemon on the
grounds that these institutions of higher learning are not as infused
with religious doctrine as elementary and secondary schools, but
rather are places where free-thinking and expression is encouraged.' 69
163. Id. at612-13.
164. Id.
165. Professor Feldman posited that "[p]erhaps the perceived inadequacy of Lemon has
something to do with the relatively thin connection between the three-pronged test and an
expressly articulated theory of the purposes of the Establishment Clause." Feldman, supra note
157, at 693.
166. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
167. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
168. Id. at 689.
169. Id. at 686-89. "Furthermore, by their very nature, college and postgraduate courses
tend to limit the opportunities for sectarian influence by virtue of their own internal disciplines.
Many church-related colleges and universities are characterized by high degree of academic
freedom and seek to evoke free and critical responses from their students." Id. at 686; see Davey
v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 755-56 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit attempted to compare Davey
with cases in which there was a "suppression of dangerous ideas." Davey, 299 F.3d at 755. The
court was equating expressive conduct to educational preference, explaining that "the university
is a traditional sphere of free expression." Id. at 765 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 199-
200 (1991)). This statement in Davey is interesting considering that the students who attend
Northwest College pledge to live in a Christ-centered environment in which they are not allowed
to drink alcoholic beverages, cohabitate, have sexual relations, engage in public displays of
affection, wear spaghetti straps, expose their midriffs, or hang "inappropriate literature or
posters" on their walls. Students who do not follow these rules are subject to disciplinary action
by the school. The students are held to these rules both during school term and also during their
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Particularly, the Court impressed that an important aspect of the law
granting funding to these institutions was that it "was carefully
drafted to ensure that the federally subsidized facilities would be
devoted to the secular and not the religious function of the recipient
institutions.' 170  Thus, despite the grant of public aid to a religious
institution, Tilton demonstrated a continuing separationist mentality
threaded into the Court's construction of the Establishment Clause.
However, in the decades that followed Lemon, competing
theories of the purpose underlying the Establishment Clause
developed within the Court. In Lynch v. Donnelly, 7' Justice
O'Connor used the Lemon test as fodder to develop the endorsement
test.'72 In her concurring opinion in Lynch, Justice O'Connor outlined
the following interpretation of the Lemon test:
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's
actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. The
effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government's actual
purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of
endorsement or disapproval. An affirmative answer to either
question should render the challenged practice invalid. 173
Justice O'Connor's formulation moved away from the secular-
religious distinction emphasized in Lemon and Tilton to a focus on
government endorsement or disapproval. 174 The endorsement test was
aimed at not making "a person's religious beliefs relevant to his or her
standing in the political community by conveying a message 'that
religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred." 1 75
The Court has recently transformed this non-endorsement
understanding of the Establishment Clause into an understanding that
the government must treat the beliefs and conduct of the religious and
breaks. NORTHWEST COLLEGE, STUDENT HANDBOOK: LIVING IN COMMUNITY, available at
http://www.nwcollege.edu/handbooks/11community.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
170. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 679.
171. 465 U.S. 668 (1984)
172. Id. at 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 690.
174. See Feldman, supra note 157, at 694-95.
175. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). Justice
Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Scalia, criticized the
endorsement test in a separate opinion in Allegheny, in which he stated:
Either the endorsement test must invalidate scores of traditional practices recognizing
the place religion holds in our culture, or it must be twisted and stretched to avoid
inconsistency with practices we know to have been permitted in the past, while
condemning similar practices with no greater endorsement effect simply by reason of
their lack of historical antecedent. Neither result is acceptable.
Id. at 674 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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non-religious equally. This new interpretation was seen in Mitchell v.
Helms, 76 a case involving government aid in the form of materials and
equipment to public and private schools. 77 In Mitchell, a plurality of
the Court held that such aid did not offend the Establishment Clause
because the aid did not result in religious indoctrination, program
eligibility was determined neutrally, and the aid program did not
involve providing prohibited content nor define its recipients by
reference to religion. 7 Justice Thomas, writing for the plurality,
stated: "In distinguishing between indoctrination that is attributable
to the State and indoctrination that is not, we have consistently turned
to the principle of neutrality, upholding aid that is offered to a broad
range of groups or persons without regard to their religion. "179
Mitchell, therefore, represents a subtle shift in the Court's conception
of the Establishment Clause. While the endorsement test provides
that the government may not favor one particular religion over
another, the Mitchell formulation of the Establishment Clause made"evenhandedness neutrality" the principal inquiry for school aid.'
However, some of the members of the Mitchell Court expressed
concern with the emphasis on neutrality. This concern was seen in
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice
Breyer,181 and in Justice Souter's dissent, which was joined by Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg.' 2 Justice Souter argued that the plurality's
conception of evenhandedness neutrality as a sufficient test of
constitutionality would eliminate the inquiry into the law's effects. 83
Justice Souter articulated the establishment prohibition of government
aid to religious funding as the following:
It is meant to guarantee the right of individual conscience
against compulsion, to protect the integrity of religion against
corrosion of secular support, and to preserve the unity of
political society against the implied exclusion of the less favored
and the antagonism of controversy over public support for
religious causes."' 84
176. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
177. Id. at 801.
178. Id. at 835.
179. Id. at 809.
180. Id. at 838.
181. Id. at 836-40.
182. Id. at 878-85.
183. Id. at 869. Specifically, Justice Souter argued that "[a]dopting the plurality's rule
would permit practically any government aid to religion so long as it could be supplied on terms
ostensibly comparable to the terms under which aid was provided to nonreligious recipients." Id.
at 901 n.19.
184. Id. at 868.
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While agreeing that aid was permissible under the Establishment
Clause because it could not reasonably be viewed as endorsing
religion,18 Justice O'Connor aligned with Justice Souter in his concern
with the supremacy placed on neutrality by the plurality.1 6  The
following section will discuss how the Court's evenhanded neutrality
within establishment operates in funding cases involving free speech
claims.
D. The Crossover Between Free Speech Criteria and Establishment
Neutrality
In recent free speech cases, the Court has intermingled
Establishment Clause neutrality criteria with those found in a free
speech examination.17 This blending can be seen in Good News Club
v. Milford Central School,' a case that involved an elementary school
that opened its facilities to the community for after-school activities."'
However, the school did not allow the facilities to be utilized for
religious purposes. 9 ' The Supreme Court held that this restriction
was unconstitutional because the elementary school opened up a
limited public forum to activities that served a variety of purposes and
therefore, it could not discriminate because of viewpoint."' Although
the Court acknowledged that a state interest in avoiding an
Establishment Clause violation might be a sufficiently compelling
interest to justify content-based discrimination, the Court stated it was
unclear whether it would justify viewpoint discrimination.192
185. Id. at 867.
186. Id. at 838-41. Justice Souter argued that while neutrality is a prominent concern in an
Establishment inquiry, the definition of "neutrality" has changed since Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 878-84. In Everson, Justice Souter argues,"neutrality" connoted the government's "required median position between aiding and
handicapping religion." Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 879. The Court then redefined "neutral" to
characterize a benefit or aid as secular. Id. at 879-81. In the 1980's, "neutral" was again
redefined to mean "evenhandedness" when allocating aid on some common basis to religious and
secular recipients. Id. at 881.
187. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993)
(holding that a school district's policy against opening school facilities to groups for religious
purposes, where a group desired to show a film relating to family values from a "Christian
perspective," violated the First Amendment because it was viewpoint discrimination); Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that the federal or Missouri Establishment Clause was
not a compelling justification to allow a state university to violate students' free speech rights by
excluding religious groups from university facilities that were generally available for activities of
registered students).
188. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
189. Id. at 102.
190. Id. at 103.
191. Id. at 107-12.
192. Id. at 112-13.
[Vol. 27:585
2003] Public Funding for Theological Training 611
Nevertheless, the Good News Court found that the school's
reliance on the Establishment Clause was "unavailing."' 93 Likening
Good News to its prior decisions in Lamb's Chapel and Widmar, the
Court held there was no establishment violation because the school
made its forum available to other organizations, the religious club's
meetings were held after school hours, the meetings were open to any
students who obtained parental consent, and the meetings were not
sponsored by the school.'94 Thus, the Court's free speech analysis was
underlain by the establishment objective of evenhandedness
neutrality; the religious club wanted "nothing more than to be treated
neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other
groups." '195  Together Good News, Lamb's Chapel, and Widmar
establish that governmental suppression of private religious expression
that would otherwise fall within the scope of a government program is
viewpoint discrimination. 96
The next section will discuss how the Ninth Circuit improperly
imported a forum analysis into its decision in Davey v. Locke and
distorted the free exercise neutrality inquiry. The court executed the
importation by relying on an establishment neutrality paradigm.
E. The Ninth Circuit's Inaccurate Construction of Neutrality in Davey v.
Locke
As discussed in Part III, the Ninth Circuit sidestepped a true
prohibition analysis by artificially crafting a prohibition of Davey's
free exercise based on his status as a theology student. The Ninth
Circuit ultimately subjected the Washington law to strict scrutiny
because it found that the law disqualifying theology students from
state funds was not neutral; 97 moreover, it found that the law on its
face discriminated on the basis of religious pursuit. 98 The Ninth
Circuit reached this conclusion by applying a free speech forum
analysis, concluding that "[t]he bottom line is that the government
may limit the scope of a program that it will fund, but once it opens a
neutral 'forum' (fiscal or physical), with secular criteria, the benefits
may not be denied on account of religion.' 199
193. Id. at 113
194. Id.
195. Id. at 114.
196. Lark, supra note 147, at 329.
197. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 758 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2075
(May 19, 2003).
198. Id. at 757.
199. Id. at 756.
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The Ninth Circuit improperly grafted the free speech forum
analysis on to the free exercise analysis through use of an
establishment neutrality paradigm similar to the Supreme Court's
funding analysis in Good News.200 In addition, in determining whether
Washington infringed on Davey's right to free exercise, the Ninth
Circuit distorted the Lukumi analysis of neutral laws of general
applicability. 211 While the Supreme Court in Lukumi indicated that a
free exercise analysis has parallels to free speech analysis, it did not
import the categories of the analysis into determinations of free
1 202exercise.
The neutrality required in the free exercise analysis is that the
object of the law is not to prohibit, hinder, or burden religious practices
or belief; whether the law is viewpoint-neutral is not within the
analytical framework of the Free Exercise Clause.23 Davey frames the
argument that the Washington law prohibiting the application of state
funds to theology students as not neutral-as Washington offering a
benefit to all, but excluding some on the basis of religion. 20 4 The
Ninth Circuit held that the effect of this exclusion was coercive
suppression of religious ideas.205 In support of its holding, the Ninth
Circuit subjected the Washington law to a limited public forum
analysis within a free speech context.20 6 In such an analysis, once the
government opens a limited public forum it cannot exclude access on
the basis of viewpoint. 20 7 In contrast, the paramount inquiry in a free
exercise analysis is not assessing the government's inclusion or
exclusion of religion alone, as it is in a forum analysis, but rather how
that inclusion or exclusion may coerce or hinder religious practice or
belief.2 1
The current conception of government neutrality in
establishment jurisprudence runs through Davey's formulation of
Washington's prohibition of Davey's free exercise. Not only did the
Ninth Circuit inappositely use free speech criteria in its formulation in
Davey, it also imported those criteria on the theory that Davey's
interest in pursuing a major in theology should be equally regarded as
200. See Good News, 533 U.S. 98.
201. Cf. Green, supra note 10, at 677-79.
202. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543.
203. Id. at 533; see Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise:
Smith, Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 865-66
(2001); cf. Green, supra note 10, at 677-80.
204. See Davey, 299 F.3d at 757-58.
205. Id. at 760.
206. Id. at 756.
207. See supra Part IV.B.
208. See supra Part IV.A.
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any other major pursued by any other student eligible for the
Scholarship, religious or nonreligious.2 °9 The Ninth Circuit's opinion
pivots on the theory that by "singling out" a theology student to be
exempt from the Scholarship, Washington was discriminating on the
basis of religion.10
While this form of analysis was appropriate in Good News, where
the Supreme Court determined whether a religious club's inclusion in
a limited public forum at a public school would offend the federal
Establishment Clause,2 11 it is not appropriate in analyzing whether a
law exhibits overt or masked hostility to religion. In Davey, the object
of section 28B.10.814 of the Revised Code of Washington, the statute
that restricted the application of state funds toward theology majors,
was to avoid violating Washington's Establishment Clause
requirement that "[n]o public money ... shall be appropriated for or
applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, "212 not to
single-out theology students or to coerce those students from majoring
in theology.
In sum, rather than adopting the Ninth Circuit's muddled
neutrality analysis, there are three reasons the Supreme Court should
follow the Lukumi analysis to determine whether Washington's
Promise Scholarship had the object of prohibiting or burdening
religious belief or practice. First, if the Supreme Court extended a
forum analysis to the free exercise arena in cases where rights of free
speech are not implicated, it would distort the free exercise inquiry to
protect state actions that do not offend the historical understanding of
the Free Exercise Clause. While the underlying principles of free
exercise and free speech inquiries are analogous, each attempting to
protect individuals from government coercion, the application of those
inquiries differs. The forum analysis is inapposite because it focuses
on how the government may coerce individuals' speech through
restrictions on availability of limited public forums. In contrast, a free
exercise inquiry does not focus on availability of government benefits,
but rather on how non-neutral laws prohibit religious observers' belief
or practice.
Second, if the Supreme Court imported a free speech forum
analysis into a free exercise analysis it would, of necessity, be through
an establishment neutrality paradigm. It would transfer the emphasis
in the free exercise inquiry from whether the object of government
209. Davey, 299 F.3d at 754.
210. Id. at 760.
211. Good News, 533 U.S. at 112-13 (2001).
212. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.
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action was coercive to whether religious observers were treated
evenhandedly. If the Court were to characterize all laws that refer to
religion on their face as not viewpoint neutral, and violating
evenhandedness neutrality principles under the Establishment Clause,
it would preclude the government from ever imposing incidental
burdens on religious practitioners regardless of the underlying
interest-any government action that touched religious practitioners
would be construed as not evenhanded and not neutral. Regardless of
whether there was a prohibition on religious belief or practice or
whether a substantial burden was imposed on the religious
practitioner, the action would be subject to strict scrutiny.
Finally, if the Supreme Court adopted a free exercise analytical
scheme similar to that executed by the Ninth Circuit in Davey v.
Locke, the outcome would infringe on the right of states to fashion
their own more protective establishment provision in the space allotted
between the federal Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause.
V. THE FEDERALISM PROBLEM: THE WASHINGTON STATE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE SHOULD BE A COMPELLING
JUSTIFICATION IF STRICT SCRUTINY IS APPLIED
This Part discusses compelling interest under strict scrutiny and
Washington's undisputed interest in abiding by its own more
protective establishment provision.
The Constitution differentiates between those areas of human
conduct subject to the regulation of the States and those subject
to the powers of the Federal Government. The substantive
powers of the two governments, in many instances, are distinct.
And in every case where we are called upon to balance the
interest in [a constitutionally protected right] against other
interests, it seems to me important that we should keep in the
forefront the question of whether those other interests are state
or federal. 13
Justice Thomas recently quoted this statement in his concurring
opinion in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.14 His concurrence stated that
federal courts should strike a proper balance between the demands of a
federal constitutional amendment and "the federalism prerogatives of
States on the other."21  Justice Thomas's discussion suggests that
states should be allowed room to experiment with their own
213. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 503-04, (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
214. 536 U.S. 639, 679 n.3 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
215. Id. at 679.
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approaches to religion.216 Achieving this desired balance between the
demands of the Free Exercise Clause and the federalism prerogative of
Washington in applying its own stricter establishment provision are
heavily implicated in the impending Supreme Court decision in Locke
v. Davey.
A. Washington's More Protective Establishment Clause
While a state constitution may not provide less protection than
the federal constitution, it may provide more.217  In State v.
Gunwall,218 the Washington Supreme Court set out neutral criteria for
determining whether, in certain circumstances, the Washington
Constitution would be considered as extending broader rights to its
citizens than the U.S. Constitution."9 The court stressed that the
Supreme Court has allowed for state's broader protection of rights
because "each state has the 'sovereign right to adopt in its own
Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred
by the Federal Constitution. '"'220 The Washington Supreme Court
has noted that "the constitution is the expression of the people's will,
adopted by them," '221 and Justice Utter of the Washington Supreme
216. See Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 768 (9th Cir. 2002) (McKeown, J., dissenting),
cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2075 (May 19, 2003).
217. The analogy of a floor and ceiling is often made when discussing the interplay
between the Federal Constitution and state constitutions. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-
The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1408 (1982). The
Federal Constitution provides the "floor" and the "ceiling" for a certain personal liberties; states
may operate as they choose in the space between. Id.
218. 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).
219. Id. at 58, 720 P.2d at 811. The criteria are: (1) the textual language; (2) differences in
the texts; (3) Constitutional history; (4) preexisting state law; (5) structural differences; and (6)
matters of particular state or local concern. Id.
220. Id. at 59, 720 P.2d at 811 (quoting Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,
81 (1980)). In addition to Washington's Constitution, nineteen state constitutional provisions
provide broader protection than the U.S. Constitution, specifically banning the application of
government funds toward religious education. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, §5; DEL. CONST. art. X, §
3; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3; GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, VII; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; IDAHO
CONST. art. IX, § 5; Ky. CONST. § 189; MASS. CONST. art. XLVI, § 2; MO. CONST. art. IX, § 8;
MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6; NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 10; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 3; N.D.
CONST. art. VIII, § 5; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 5; OR. CONST. art. I, § 5; S.D. CONST. art. VI, §
3; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 7; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 3; WYo. CONST. art. I, § 19; Briefs of States
of Vt., Mass., Mo., Or., & S.D. & of Commws. of N. Mariana Is. & Puerto Rico Amici Curiae
in Supp. of Pet'rs at 24 n.8, Locke v. Davey, 123 S. Ct. 2075 (2003) (No. 02-1315) [hereinafter
States Amici Curiae].
221. State ex rel. Albright v. Spokane, 64 Wash. 2d 767, 770, 394 P.2d 231, 233 (1964); see
Justice Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State
Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 491, 511
(1984). Justice Utter argues that Washington's Declaration of Rights is the primary guarantor of
the rights of Washingtonians and that Washington State judges have a duty to "examine it first
whenever a state law, regulation, or action is alleged to violate the fundamental rights of a
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Court distinguished the Washington Constitution from the U.S.
Constitution as "a more 'political' document" because it may be easily
amended to reflect current local values.222
The Washington Constitution maintains a strong division
between church and state, reflecting Washingtonians' steadfast desire
to uphold a firm separation in this area. Article I, section 11 of the
Washington Constitution provides one of the more restrictive
provisions regarding the separation of church and state,223 reflecting
Washingtonians' desire to maintain a firm separation between church
and state.224 Washington's original Establishment Clause was adopted
in 1889.225 Its initial composition reflected the federal requirement
that states seeking Union admission must adopt a constitution
containing a division between church and state.226 In 1904, article I,
section 11 was amended to provide that the clause should not be
'construed as to forbid the employment by the state of a chaplain for
the state penitentiary and for such of the state reformatories. ,227
Additional amendments in 1958 and 1993 added "state custodial,
Washington citizen, and to interpret it in the truly independent manner that history, logic, and
the principles of federalism require." Id. at 524.
222. Utter, supra note 221, at 495.
223. See Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine
Amendments: Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 551,
591 (2003).
224. Article I, section 11 should be read together with article IX, section 4, which states:
"All schools maintained or supported wholly or in part by the public funds shall be forever free
from sectarian control or influence." WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 4; see ROBERT F. UTTER &
HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 25,
159 (2002).
225. As originally adopted in 1889, article I, section 11 read:
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief, and
worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be molested or
disturbed in person, or property, on account of religion; but the liberty of conscience
hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify
practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state. No public money or
property shall be appropriated for, or applied to any religious worship, exercise or
instruction, or the support of any religious establishment. No religious qualification
shall be required for any public office, or employment, nor shall any person be
incompetent as a witness, or juror, in consequence of his opinion on matters of
religion, nor be questioned in any court of justice touching his religious belief to affect
the weight of his testimony.
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 (1889). For a history of the Establishment Clause of the Washington
State Constitution, see Robert F. Utter & Edward J. Larson, Church and State on the Frontier:
The History of the Establishment Clauses in the Washington State Constitution, 15 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 451 (1988).
226. DeForrest, supra note 223, at 590. Provisions in state constitutions requiring the
separation between church and state are called Blaine Amendments. Approximately thirty states
have Blaine Amendments incorporated into their constitutions. Id. at 554.
227. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 (amended 1904).
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correctional, and mental institutions, "228 and "county's or public
district's hospital, health care facility, or hospice ' 229 to the list of
permissible state institutions that may employ chaplains. In addition
to illustrating the malleable nature of the Washington Constitution in
adapting to changing mores and needs of the citizens of Washington,
these amendments also expose the absence of any modification in the
original amendment's prohibition against the application of state
funds toward religious instruction. While the Washington
Constitution has been amended to allow for chaplains, these changes
are minor, and have never been funding modifications.
Washingtonians have not exhibited a desire to follow the federal lead
in draining the Establishment Clause of its force.
The Washington Supreme Court has repeatedly enforced
Washington's stricter Establishment Clause, simultaneously
providing a broader protection for free exercise and enforcing greater
protection between church and state.23 ° In 1989, the Washington
Supreme Court decided a case very similar to Davey. In Witters v.
Commission for the Blind,231 a blind man applied to receive vocation
rehabilitation funds to study at a private religious school to become a
pastor, missionary, or youth director. 32 The U.S. Supreme Court
overturned the first Washington Supreme Court decision denying aid
based on a violation of the federal Establishment Clause.23 3  The
Supreme Court reversed, stating that while the federal Establishment
Clause was not offended, "[o]n remand, the state court is of course
free to consider the applicability of the 'far stricter' dictates of the
Washington State Constitution. ' 234  On remand, the Washington
Supreme Court held that the grant of aid to Witters would violate
article I, section 11 of Washington's Constitution and the "applicant's
individual interest in receiving a religious education must therefore
give way to the state's greater need to uphold its constitution. "23s The
court stated: "[O]ur state constitution prohibits the taxpayers from
228. Id. (amended 1957).
229. Id. (amended 1993).
230. UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 224, at 25.
231. 102 Wash. 2d 624, 689 P.2d 53 (1984), rev'd, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
232. Id. at 626, 689 P.2d at 54-55.
233. Witters v. Comm'n for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489 (1986), rev'g, 102 Wash. 2d 624,
689 P.2d 53 (1984).
234. Witters, 474 U.S. at 489.
235. Witters v. Comm'n for the Blind, 112 Wash. 2d 363, 373, 771 P.2d 1119, 1123
(1989). The Washington Supreme Court made this finding within its discussion of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not within its free exercise inquiry. Id. at 372-
73, 771 P.2d at 1123-24. The court did not find that Witters's right to free exercise was
violated. Id. at 370-72, 771 P.2d at 1121-22.
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being put in the position of paying for the religious instruction of
aspirants to the clergy with whose religious views they may
disagree."236
The Washington Supreme Court continues to uphold the
prohibition on the application of state funds toward religious
education articulated in the Witters decision. That court recently held
in State ex rel. Gallwey v. Grimm23 7 that article IX, section 4 of the
Washington State Constitution, which provides that all schools
maintained by public funds must be free from sectarian influence, 238
does not apply to institutions of higher education.239  The court
allowed a state grant disbursement to students who attended
religiously affiliated colleges. While this holding seems to reduce the
force of Washington's prohibition against the application of state
funds to religious education, the majority carefully distinguished
Gallwey from Witters, noting that the state grants were contingent on
a student's adherence to the grant program's religious exclusion. 24
The grant exclusion required that a student not be enrolled in any
211program that includes religious instruction, worship, or exercise.
The Gallwey holding confirmed the Witters holding by revisiting
the prohibition against the application of state funds to religious
instruction provided by article I, section 11 of the Washington
Constitution.242 The court stated that:
In interpreting the phrase "religious ... instruction," as used in
article I, section XI, this court stressed "that the words appear
after two or more specific terms: 'worship' and 'exercise.' This,
we believe, is an indication that the framers of our constitution
did not intend the word 'instruction' to be construed without
limit, but that the proscribed field be confined to that category
of instruction that resembles worship and manifests a devotion
to religion and religious principles in thought, feeling, belief,
and conduct, i.e., instruction that is devotional in nature and
designed to induce faith and belief in the student."243
Though the court conceded that the purview of instruction implicated
by article I, section 11 is limited, the court would not weaken the
236. Id. at 365, 771 P.2d at 1120.
237. 146 Wash. 2d 445, 48 P.3d 274 (2002).
238. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 4.
239. Gallwey, 146 Wash. 2d at 474, 48 P.3d at 288.
240. Id. at 468, 48 P.3d at 285.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 467-69, 48 P.3d at 285-86.
243. Id. at 467, 48 P.3d at 285 (quoting Calvary Bible Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of
Regents, 72 Wash. 2d 912, 919, 436 P.2d 189 (1967)).
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Witters holding which prohibits state funds from being applied to
religious instruction that is devotional in nature and designed to
induce faith and belief.
B. May an Establishment Violation Provide a Compelling Justification?
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to hold that the violation
of government establishment of religion, whether under the federal or
a state constitution, is a compelling justification for a state to violate
the Free Exercise Clause.244 In Widmar v. Vincent,245 the court stated
that a state interest in upholding a greater separation between church
and state than is provided under the Establishment Clause of the
Federal Constitution is limited by the Free Exercise and the Free
Speech Clauses of the First Amendment.246 However, Justice White,
in his dissent in Widmar, cautioned that the "[t]he majority's position
will inevitably lead to ... contradictions and tensions between the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses . ".."247 He argued that
because the burden on the party's free exercise was minimal, the state
should only need to show that the regulation furthered some
permissible state end.248 Justice White believed that "just as there is
room under the Religion Clauses for state polices that may have some
beneficial effect on religion, there is also room for state polices that
may incidentally burden religion." '249
There is a dearth of precedent for the proposition that a state
Establishment Clause provides a compelling interest. However, in a
1973 case, Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann,250 the court found that the
Missouri Constitution's more protective establishment clause was a
compelling justification for a possible infringement of Free Exercise.2 1
In Luetkemeyer, a Missouri county refused to transport children to
attend a Catholic school because, absent a specific statutory authority
244. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273 (1981) (holding that neither the
federal nor the Missouri Establishment Clause was a compelling justification to allow a state
university to violate students free speech rights by excluding religious groups from university
facilities that were generally available for activities of registered students).
245. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
246. Id. at 276.
247. Id. at 282 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White was echoing the "double-barreled
dilemma" Justice Stewart addressed in his concurrence in Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398, 413 (1963)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
248. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 288-89. Justice White disagreed with the majority that the
exclusion of religious groups from student facilities was a violation of the student's free speech
rights. Id. at 285-86. He argued, rather, that, if anything, it was a violation of the student's free
exercise. Id. at 288.
249. Id. at 282.
250. 364 F. Supp. 376 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
251. Id.at386.
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to use state funds, the Missouri Constitution prohibits the use of such
funds to aid religions or religious institutions.52  The court
unequivocally stated: "[T]he long established constitutional policy of
the State of Missouri, which insists upon a degree of separation of
church and state to probably a higher degree than that required by the
First Amendment, is indeed a 'compelling state interest' ....23 The
Court allowed Missouri to refuse to fund transporting the children in
order for the state to obey the confines of its own constitution.
C. Washington's More Protective Establishment Clause Is a Sufficiently
Compelling Justification to Survive Strict Scrutiny
Even if the Supreme Court follows the Ninth Circuit's reasoning,
concluding that Davey's right to free exercise was in fact violated, the
Supreme Court should reject the Ninth Circuit's holding that the
prospect of violating the Washington State Constitution is not a
sufficiently compelling interest to justify the incidental burden Davey
sustained as a result of his disqualification from the scholarship
program.
First, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion unnecessarily expands the
Free Exercise Clause to fill the vacuum between it and the
Establishment Clause, leaving no room for states to formulate a more
protective understanding of establishment.254 It is precisely this"room" that is in jeopardy of being engulfed by a bloated
understanding of free exercise in Davey. As discussed above, by
sidestepping a prohibition analysis and misapplying the neutrality
inquiry under the Free Exercise Clause, the Ninth Circuit filled the
space between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.
This space has been the traditional sphere open to states to formulate
their own understanding of the religion clauses.
If the Court fails to recognize states' establishment clauses as
compelling, not only will it exclude states from the dialogue, 255 but
also the more protective establishment clauses will become
superfluous. If the Supreme Court affirms the Ninth Circuit decision
in Davey v. Locke, the analytical basis for Washington Supreme Court
decisions like Witters and GaUwey will be weakened if not obliterated.
State courts will not be able to interpret and apply their own more
252. Id.at377.
253. Id. at 386.
254. See Brief of Amicus Curiae of ACLU, ACLU of Wash. et al., in Supp. of Pet'rs at 9-
14, Locke v. Davey, 123 S. Ct. 2075 (2003) (No. 02-1315).
255. See States Amici Curiae, supra note 220 (arguing that a Supreme Court decision
upholding the Ninth Circuit in Davey would "remove States from the policy debate concerning
the proper role of government viz religion").
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protective establishment provisions because they will be constrained at
every turn by the federal Free Exercise Clause.
Second, the Ninth Circuit's decision disables Washington, and
other states with more protective establishment provisions, from
resting on what has historically been an important interest asserted by
the Washington legislature and affirmed by the Washington Supreme
Court. Washington should not be forced to apply money toward
pursuit of a theology degree in violation of its own constitution where
the burdens imposed on the religious observer are incidental." 6 This
result places Washington in the position of responsibility for religious
observers' spiritual development, which is outside the protection
provided either by the federal Free Exercise Clause or the Washington
State Constitution.
Joshua Davey's theological training is precisely the kind of
religious instruction which, according to the Washington
Constitution, cannot be funded by the state. Davey's declaration
submitted to the district court stated that each course at Northwest
College "is taught from the viewpoint of what Christians believe to be
absolute truth, as conveyed in the Bible." '257 Northwest's instruction
of Davey as a theology major is devotional in nature and designed to
induce faith and belief. Although Davey believed that withdrawing
the scholarship money imposed a "back-door tax" on him because of
his religious beliefs,2"' applying the scholarship money to his
theological degree at Northwest College would force Washington
taxpayers to pay for Davey's religious instruction with which they
may disagree.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should reverse the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Davey v. Locke. The right to free exercise should be zealously
guarded, and laws that have the object of prohibiting or hindering
religious belief or practice should be subject to strict scrutiny.
However, when examining potential violations of free exercise, courts
should not distort the traditional analysis by unnecessarily importing
theories from other categories of First Amendment inquiries. Not all
government action that has the effect of imposing incidental burdens
on religious observers offends the right to free exercise. To
characterize free exercise protection as such paints the right of what
256. See Davey, 299 F.3d 748, 768 (9th Cir. 2002) (McKeown, J., dissenting).
257. Decl. of Davey, Ex. A, supra note 12, at 4.
258. Id. at 7.
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religious observers may exact from the government, not as what the
government may not do to religious observers.
Washington's Promise Scholarship program may have "singled-
out" Joshua Davey, a theology student, as ineligible for the
Scholarship. However, it does not necessarily follow that the state's
funding decision encroached on Davey's right to free exercise. In
reaching its decision in Davey v. Locke the Ninth Circuit sidestepped a
true prohibition analysis under the Free Exercise Clause. Instead, the
court devised an entitlement to state funds by relying on Davey's
status as a theology student, rather than examining whether the state
action prohibited or imposed a substantial burden on his religious
belief or practice.
The Ninth Circuit also incorrectly determined that the
Washington law restricting the application of scholarship funds to
theology students was not neutral. The court improperly imported a
forum analysis from a free speech examination into its determination
of whether Washington violated Davey's right to free exercise. This
importation was executed through an establishment neutrality
paradigm, asking whether the government has taken an evenhanded
approach toward religion, not whether the object of the law in
question prohibits or hinders religious belief or practice.
In addition to reversing the Ninth Circuit based on the
inapposite mixing of analytical categories described above, the
Supreme Court should reverse the Ninth Circuit because Washington
has a firmly entrenched desire to uphold a greater separation between
church and state than that minimally required by the U.S.
Constitution. If the Court holds that Washington's law restricting the
application of funds toward degrees in theology violates free exercise,
it should also hold that the state's observance of its own more
protective establishment clause is a compelling justification for the law
to withstand strict scrutiny. There is room between federal
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause in which states
may fashion their own more protective establishment provisions.
States should be allowed the opportunity to experiment with their own
approaches to religion within that space. The Washington
Constitution is an expression of the will of the people of Washington
State. Until Washingtonians decide to amend their state constitution
to allow for the application of taxpayers' funds to religious education,
the Supreme Court should respect that expression.
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